Executive summary
The demand pull is policy, not cycle
Three policy moves have lifted defense demand simultaneously. The Defense Buildup Program commits ¥43 tn across FY2023–2027 and targets defense-related spending at 2% of GDP by FY2027 [MOD 2023]. Under PM Takaichi, the government moved to front-load the 2% level into FY2025 via a roughly ¥1.3 tn supplementary, lifting the ratio from ~1.8% to 2.0% [Nikkei 2025]. And in April 2026 the cabinet revised the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment, scrapping the five-category limit and opening direct export of major platforms [IISS 2026].
Capacity, not orders, is now the constraint
Order visibility is no longer the binding issue. Mitsubishi Heavy Industries alone carried a group order backlog above ¥11 tn, with Defense & Space the fastest-growing segment [MHI 2026]. The constraint has shifted to production capacity and a supplier base thinned by two decades of exits [MOF 2024]. The 2023 production-base law and profit-margin reform — lifting contract margins from ~5% toward 10% — are the policy response [Breaking Defense 2024].