What triggered the collapse?
After the prime minister's remarks on a Taiwan-Strait contingency, Beijing advised citizens against travel to Japan and directed agencies to cut Japan-bound volume to 60% through March 2026 [Nikkei 2025]. Carriers offered free changes and refunds; group tours saw mass cancellations [JNTO 2026]. January 2026 China arrivals were just 385,300, down 60.7% [JNTO 2026].
Why did group tourism collapse while FIT cushioned the blow?
Group tourism took the hardest hit — regional ryokan that depend on Chinese coaches reported near-empty Lunar New Year periods [Wedge 2026]. But individual travellers are already over 80% of the Chinese flow [NRI 2025]; the FIT base, skewed younger and more independent, is the channel most likely to return first once confidence steadies.
Why is the revenue hit contained?
China was Japan's top spender at JPY 2.0 trn, 21% of 2025 spending [JTA 2026], so the loss is real. But its share of arrivals had already fallen from 30% in 2019 to 21% in 2025 [JNTO 2025]; the diversified Western and East-Asian base absorbs much of the volume gap, if not the full spend.
Chart: China arrivals to Japan, million, 2019–2027F. Sources: JNTO 2025, JNTO 2026, Nikkei 2025, Kira triangulation. 2026–27 = [Kira estimates].
Methodology note. China arrival figures for 2019 and 2025 are drawn directly from JNTO by-nationality releases [JNTO 2025]. The January 2026 provisional figure (385,300, −60.7%) is from the JNTO 2026 provisional series [JNTO 2026]. The 2026F full-year estimate (5.5m) and 2027F estimate (6.5m) are KIRA-derived [Kira estimates], triangulated from the Nikkei-reported agency directive [Nikkei 2025], the NRI FIT/group split [NRI 2025], and historical recovery rates from analogous Japan-China travel disruptions. The group/FIT share (>80% FIT) is from NRI Dec 2025 [NRI 2025]. Roughly 22% of quantitative claims in this report are KIRA-derived; 78% are externally cited.